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[Crim. No. 10346. In Bank. Dec. 23, 1966.]

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. PHILLIP
DEAN ELLIS, Defendant and Appellant.
[1] .Witnesses-Self-incrimination-Identi1ication of Accused.The privilege against self-incrimination applies to evidence of
the accused's communications or testimony, but not to real or
physical evidence derived from him. The results of voice identification tests fall within the category of real or physical evidence. .
[2] Words and Phrases--"Voice Identi1ication 'l'estn.-In a voice
identification test, the speaker is not asked to communicate
[1] See Oal.Jur.2d, Witnesses, § 19; Am.Jur., Witnesses (1st ed
§ 63).
.
:Hcx. Dig. References: [1] Witnesses, § 23; [2] Words and
Phrases; [3] Criminal Law, § 565; [4] Witnesses, § 19; [5] Criminal Law, § 453(7); [6] Privacy, § 2; Witnesses, § 23; [7] Criminal
Law, § 453(6) j [8, 10] Witnesses, §§ 14, 23; [9] Criminal Law,
§ 389; Witnesses, § 23; [11] Criminal Law, § 389 (7); Witnesses,
§ 14; [12] Criminal Law, § 453(7); Witnesses, § 23; [13] Criminal
Law, § 453; Witnesses, § 23; [14] Criminal Law, § 617; [15]
Words and Phrases; [16, 17] Criminal Law, § 627; [18] Criminal
Law, § 1404(14); Rape, §§ 96(3), 96(5).
-Retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court sitting under assignment by the Chairman of the Judicial Council.

"

)
---'/

530
.,)

I

:

t.

f

I

I'
Ij
;

J

!t

:'

l

,
I,

I

I!
,:
~

Ii

,.!

I,

I

t:
f;

PEOPLE

v.

ELLIS

lGG C.2d

ideas or knowledge of facts, but to engage in the physiological
processes necessary to produce a series of articulated sounds,
the verbal meanings of which are unimportant.
[3] Oriminal Law-Evidence-Identity.-The speech patterns of
individuals are distinctive physical characteristics that serve to
identify them just as do other physical characteristics, such as
color of eyes, hair, and skin, physical build and fingerprints.
[4] Witnesses - Self-incrimination - Defendants in Criminal
Proceedings.-The privilege against self-incrimination does not
prohibit the state from demanding assistance from an individual in criminal proceedings taken against him.
[6] Oriminal Law - Evidence - Silence as Admission - Duty to
Reply When Under Arrest.-It is no more unfair to ask a
suspect to speak for voice identification than to ask him to
appear in a lineup for visual identification.
[6] Privacy-Extent of Privilege: Witnesses-Self-incriminationIdentific~tion of Accused.-A voice test for identification
purposes contemplates no invasion into privacy; no disclosure
of thought or privately held information is requested. One's
voice is not of a private nature; it is constantly exposed to
public observation and is merely another identifying physical
characteristic.
[7] Criminal Law-Evidence-Silence as Admission.-It is not
permissible to penalize an individual for exercising his privilege against self-incrimination under the U.S. Const., 5th
Amend., when he is under police custodial interrogation.
[8] Witnesses - Self-incrimination - Oonstitutional Provisions:
Identification of Accused.-An accused has no constitutional
right to refuse to speak solely for purposes of voice identification, and the rule prohibiting comment on the failure of an
accused to testify at trial does not apply to the refusal of the
accused to speak solely for purposes of voice identification.
[9] Oriminal Law-Evidence-Facts Showing Consciousness of
Guilt: Witnesses - Self-incrimination - Identification of Accused.-Defendant's refusal to "display his voice" to permit
his identification by the victim of an assault with in'tent to
commit rape was not itself a testimonial communication; the
refusal was circumstantial evidence of consciousness of guilt.
The admission of evidence of such refusal does not violate the
privilege against self-incrimination.
[10] Witnesses - Self-incrimination - Constitutional Provisions:
Identification of Accused.-Protection against possible police
abuse in obtaining evidence is one of the primary reasons for
the existence of the privilege against self-incrimination under
the U.S. Const., Fifth Amend.
[11] Oriminal Law-Evidence-Facts Showing Consciousness of
Guilt - Conduct on Arrest: Witnesses - Self-incrimination -
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"

Constitutional Provisions.-Conduct indicatillg cOllsciousncss
of guilt is not a testimonial statement of guilt and, therefore, is
not protected by the U.S. Const., 5th Amend. By acting like n
guilty person, a man does not testify to his guilt, but merely
exposes himself to the drawing of inferences from circum stalltial evidence of his state of mind.
[12] 1d.-Evidence-Silence as Admission-Duty to Reply When
,Under Arrest: Witnesses-Self-incrimination-Identification
of AccUsed.-Where police officers warneddefendallt that he
had a right to remain silent and that anything he said could be
used against him, but did not distinguish between speech in
terms of communications and speech for voice identification,
defendant's refusal to speak may have resulted directly from
the police warning and his refusal could not be used against

him.
[13] 1d.-Evidence-Silence as Admission-Duty to Reply When
Under Arrest: Witnesses-Self-incrimination-Identification
of Accused.-Where the police, after warning defendant that
. he has a right under the U.S. Const., 5th Amend., to l'emain silent, direct defendant to speak for voice identification and he
refuses, they must, as a prerequisite to use of his refusal to
speak as evidence of a consciousness of guilt, advise him that
the" right to remain silent does not include the right to refuse
to participate in a voice identification test.
[14] 1d.-Argument of Counsel-Scope.-Interpretative, but fair,
comment on evidence submitted to a jury is proper. A prosecutor should point out the conflicts and inconsistencies in the
evidence and evidentiary matters that render the prosecution
testimony more believable than that submitted by the
"defense.
[16] Words and Phrases - "Lia.r": "Perjurer". - The term liar
implies more than offering untrue testimony; it implies a wilful
falsehood. The term perjurer has the additional element of an
oath.
[16] Criminal Law - Argument of Counsel - Comment on Witnesses.-Unless a prosecutor, in arguing that a witness committed perjury, is careful to state that his conclusion is predicated
solely on the evidence before the jury, the spectre of jury
reliance on prosecutorial access to information outside the
record is raised.
[17] 1d. - Argument of Counsel- Comment on Witnesses. - In
.attacking the credibility of defense witnesses, a single reference to a witness as having perjured himself, based on an
analysis of evidence before the jury, may be unobjectionable;
however, when a prosecutor makes repeated references to
defendant and his wife as perjurers, notwithstanding objection,
and further suggests that the issue of perjury bears directly OQ
the issue of guilt, his argument constitutes misconduct.
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[18] Id.-Appeal-Reversible Error-Argument of Prosecutor:
Rape - Assault With Intent to Commit Rape - AppealReversible Error.-In a prosecution for assault with intent to
commit rape, where the jury w!1s presented with directly conflicting evidence supported by independent witnesses on both
sides, reversal was required by the reasonable probability that
a result more favorable to defendant would have been reached
absent the error in admitting evidence that defendant refused
to take a voice identification test, and the prosecutor's misconduct in commenting on defendant's refusal and repeatedly
referring to defendant and his wife as perjurers, with the
further suggestion that the issue of perjury bore directly on
the issue of guilt.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San
Mateo County. Frank W. Rose, Judge. Reversed.
Prosecution for assault with intent to commit rape. Judgment of conviction reversed..
James R. Tormey, Jr., under appointment by the Supreme
Court, and Michael R. Nave for Defendant and Appellant.
Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, Edward P. O'Brien,
John F. Kraetzer and John Murphy, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
TRAYNOR, C. J.-Defendant appeals from a judgment of
conviction entered upon a verdict finding him guilty of assault
with intent to commit rape (Pen. Code, § 220).
The victim testified that while she was waiting for a bus in
Burlingame at 5 a.m., July 20, 1964, defendant sought to
induce her to engage in sexual intercourse. When she rebuffed
him, he threatened to use his knife to compel submission. She
saw no knife, but fled screaming, and defendant ran beside her
repeatedly whispering, "Walk. Don't run." When a newspaper boy appeared on the otherwise deserted street defendant
disappeared.
Defendant was arrested on September 9, 1964, and taken to
the San Mateo Police Department, where the victim identified
him in a lineup as her assailant. The victim also indicated that
she could identify her assailant's voice. She was placed in a
[18] See Oal.Jur.2d, Appeal and Error, § 624; Am. Jur., Trial
(1st ed § 470).
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room next to the interrogation room, and defendant was asked
to repeat phrases recited by the police. Defendant refused to
cooperate and remained silent.
Police officers testified that they advised defendant of his
right to counsel and of his right to remain silent and testified
to his responses to their questions. They also testified that he
refused to participate in the voice identification test. Defendant contends that introduction of the evidence of his refusal to
participate in a voice identification test and the prosecutor's
comments thereon violated his constitutional privilege against
self-incrimination.
[1] The privilege against self-incrimination applies to evidence of "communications or testimony" of the accused, but
not to "real or physical" evidence derived from him. (E.g.,
Schmerber v. California (1966) 384 U.S. 757, 764 [16 L.Ed.2d
908, 86 S.Ct. 1826]; Holt v. United States (1910) 218 U.S.
245, 252-253 [54 L.Ed. 1021, 31 8. Ct. 2] ; Gilbert v. United
States (9th Cir. 1966) 366 F.2d 923; United Stat-es v. Denno
(2d Cir.1966) 355 F.2d 731,738; Rigney v. Hendrick (3d Cir.
1965) 355 F.2d 710, 713-714; Kennedy V. United States (D.C.
Cir. 1965) 353 F.2d 462, 466; Caldwell V. United States (8th
Cir. ~964) 338 F.2d 385, 389; People v. Lopez (1963) 60
Ca1.2d 223, 243-244 [32 Cal.Rptr. 424, 384 P.2d 16] ; People v.
Duroncelay (1957) 48 Ca1.2d 766, 770 [312 P.2d 690] ; People
v. Trujillo (1948) 32 Cal.2d 105, 112-113 [194 P.2d 681l;
People v.' Zavala (1966) 239 Cal.App.2d 732, 738-739 [49
Cal.Rptr.129] ; 8 Wigmore, Evidence (McNaughton rev. 1961)
§ 2265, p. 386; Model Code of Evidence (1942) rule 201 (2);
Uniform Rules of Evidence (1953) rule 23 (3).) The results of
voice identification tests fall within the category of real or
physical evidence. (Gilbert V. United States, supra; Rigney v.
Hendrick, supra; People V. Lopez, supra;1 Wigmore, op. cit.,
supra; cf. People V. Graves (1966) 64 Ca1.2d 208 [49 Cal.Rptr.
386, 411 P.2d 114], cert. den., 385 U.S. 883 [17 L.Ed.2d
111, 87 8.0t. 175].) [2] In such a test, the speaker is
asked, not to communicate ideas or knowledge of facts, but to
engage in the physiological processes necessary to produce a
series of articulated sounds, the verbal meanings of which are
lOther state authority is collected at 16 A.L.R.2d 1322-1828; 2
A.L.R.2d Later Case Service. See also State V. Freeman (1965) 195 Kan.
561 [408 P.2d 612]; State v. King (1965) 44 N.J. 346 [209 A.2d 110];
Boyer v. State (Fla. App. 1966) 182 So.2d 19. For an analysis of the
limited stnte authority that excludes voice identification see Recent Cases
(1949) 24 Ind.L.J. 587.
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unimportant. The sounds alone are elicited for identification
purposes through characteristics such as pitch, tone, intonation, accent, and word stress. [3] The speech patterns of
individuals are distinctive 2 physical characteristics that serve
to identify them just as do other physical characteristics such
as color of eyes, hair, and skin, physical build and fingerprints.
Voice identification testimony is the product of an observablephysical characteristic made by an independent witness. It
is the very type of objective factual evidence, independent of
information communicated by the accused, that the privilege
encourages police to seek.s Moreover, independent iaentification testimony, unlike testimonial evidence derived from the
accused, raises no question of reliance on the veracity of the
accused. 4o Any attempt by a suspect to disguise his voice is apt
to be detected readily by those persons present who can
compare the sample with his normal voice. Furthermore, there
is no risk that one could be coerced into falsely accusing
himself. It is difficult to imagine how a suspect could be
induced to impersonate an unknown voice to incriminate
himself.
[4] It has been urged that the privilege reflects an ultimate sense of fairness that prohibits the state from demanding
assistance" of any kind-from an individual in penal proceedings
taken against him. IS The privilege includes no such prohibi2Even the untutored ear" usually can distinguish a male voice from a
female voice, a foreign accent from a local accent, a lisp from conven- tional speech, or identify a peculiar way of pronouncing certain words.
It has been reported that voices can be electronically compared by "voiceprints" and identified with much the same reliability as fingerprints.
(Newsweek, April 25, 1966; 89 Science News 293 (1966).)
3Rscobcdo v. Illinois (1964) 378 U.S. 478, 488-489 [12 L.Ed.2d 971,
94 S.Ct. 1758] ; People v. Graves, supra, 64 Cal.2d 208, 211; 8 Wigmore,
Evidl!Dce (McNaughton rev. 1961) § 2251.
4The nrgument has beeu a<lvnnced that the mere act of speaking pro<luces an implied testimonial element: an implied statement by the
nccused that "this is my voice." (Weintraub, Voice Identijicatioft" Writing Exemplars and the Privilege Agaift,st Sell-Incrimift,atioft, (1957) 10
Vand.L.Rev. 485, 505.) This contention is logically correct, but it could
easily include any situation where the subject is required to cooperate
in making possible inspection of physical chnracteristics (i.e., stance,
walk, facial features, writing, fingerprints, blood tests). The key issue,
however, is the degree of reliance on the veracity of the accused. (Ibid.)
'l'hc difficulty of deceit and the practical impossibility of a knowing
attempt at a false self-incrimination, through a voice impersonation of
a guilty party, lead us to reject this fncto!" as not being significant in
voice identification. (Sec Comment (1948) 1 Vand.L.Rev. 248, 250.)
ISSee 8 Wigmore, Evidence (McNaughton rev. 1961) § 2251, pp. 317318.
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tion. Criminal proceedings are replete with instances where at
least passive cooperation of an accused may bc constitutionally
required. 6
A suspect asked to speak for voice identification is not
subjected to the same psychological pressures said to be
generated by a demand for testimony.7 [5] It is no more
unfair to ask a suspect to speak for voice identification than to
ask him to appear in a lineup for visual identification. The
psychological pressures are reduced to the same degree,
through a limitation of alternatives. Deceit is improbable; the
simple choice for a guilty person is between conduct likely to
expose incriminating evidence and inferences as to guilt likely
to :flow from a successful refusal to participate.
A related view of the individual interest protected by the
privilege focuses on the right of privacy. (United States v.
Grunewald (2d Oir. 1956) 233 F.2d 556, 581-582 (Frank, J.,
dissenting) revd. 353 U.S. 391 [1 L.Ed.2d 931, 77 8.0t. 963, 62
A.L.R.2d 1344]; Ratner, Oonsequences of Exercising the
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination (1957) 24 U.Ohi.L.Rev.
472,488-489.) The Fifth Amendment right of privacy protects
at least uncommunicated thoughts and has been extended to
preclude compelled production of private papers and documents. (Boyd v. United States (1886) 116 U.S. 616 [29 L.Ed.
746, 6 8.0t. 524].) [6] A voice test, however, contemplates
no such intrusion into privacy; no disclosure of thought or
privately held information is requested. One's voice is hardly
of a private nature. It is constantly exposed to public observation and is merely another identifying physical characteristic.
6Examples are set forth at 8 Wigmore. Evidence (McNaughton rev.
1961) 12265, pp. 387-397. They include :fingerprinting, photographing,
or measuring of the subject. taking imprints of portions of a suspect's
body. removal of or placing articles of clothing on the subject, and requiring the accused's presence at the trial itself.
A controlling distinction sometimes made between active and passive
cooperation is. in terms of the reasons for the existence of the privilege,
more apparent than real. I I This is a distinction which is aesthetically
attractive but which seems to have no basis in history, practicality or
justice." (McCormick. Evidence (1954) § 126, p.265.) Passive cooperation is affirmative cooperation; at least passiveness of the subject is
required to take a :fingerprint or a photograph. The subject can resist
having a "fingerprint or photograph taken. There is no greater likelihood
that coercion would be employed or that a suspect would be disturbed
physical1y or psychologically in those cases where "active" cooperation
is requested than where I I passive" cooperation is necessary.
1 A demand for a statement is said to produce a " cruel trilemma."
{Murphy v. Waterfront Com. (1964) 378 U.S. 52 [12 L.Ed.2d 678, 84
S.Ct. 1594]; 8 Wigmore. Evidence (McNaughton rev. ]961) § 2251, pp.
316-317.)
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It thus appears that an extension of the privilege to voice
identification would serve none of the purposes of the privilege. It would only exclude evidence of· considerable importance when visual identification is doubtful or impossible. The
masked robber, the telephone extortionist, and the attacker in
the night may all seek refuge behind an extension of the privilege that would do little to further the welfare of accused
persons in general. Denial of access to a pertinent identifying
trait can only weaken a system dedicated to the ascertainment
of truth.
We do not leave the individual unprotected. The need for
protection is greater in confession cases where the risk of
police overzealousness is comparatively great because selfincriminating statements are the most persuasive evidence of
guilt. Testimony by a witness resulting from a purported
identification is less conclusive and· there is there~ore less
incentive for police to use unwarranted pressure in obtaining
the evidence. Nevertheless, it bears emphasis that, as in the
case of all police procedures for the securing of nonprivileged
evidence, fundamental principles of fairness and due process
are always applicable to prevent abuse. (See Rochin v. California (1952) 342 U.S. 165 [96 L.Ed. 183, 72 S.Ct. 205, 25
A.L.R.2~ 1396] ; People v. Matteson (1964) 61 Ca1.2d 466 [39
Cal.Rptr. 1,393 P.2d 161].)
Even though evidence obtained from a voice identification! is
not within. the privil~ge against self-incrimination, the question remains whether evidence and comment on a refusal to
take such a test is admissible. [7] It is clear that "it is
impermissible to penalize an individual for exercising his
Fifth Amendment privilege when he is under police custodial
interrogation." (Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436,
468, fn. 37 [16 L.Ed.2d 694, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 10 A.L.R.3d 974].)
This doctrine is a logical extension (People v. Cockrell (1965)
63 Ca1.2d 659 [47 Cal.Rptr. 788, 408 P.2d 116]) of the rule of
Gt'iffin v. California (1965) 380 U.S. 609 [14 L.Ed.2d 106, 85
8.Ct. 1229], prohibiting comment on the failure of an accused
to testify at trial. Comment on refusal to testify was held to be
"a penalty imposed by courts for exercising a constitutional
privilege. It cuts down on the privilege by making its assertion costly." (Griffin v. California, supra, at p. 614.)
[8] Such a rule is not applicable when, as in this case, the
defendant has no constitutional right to refuse to speak solely
for purposes of voice identification.
[9] Nor was defendant's refusal to "display his voice"

.)
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itself a testimonial communication. It was circumstantial evidence of consciousness of guilt, and like similar evidence, such
as escape from custody (People v. Otis (1959) 174 Cal.App.2d
119 [344 P.2d 342]), false alibi (People v. Allison (1966) 245
Cal.App.2d 568, 576 [54 Cal.Rptr. 148]), flight (People v.
Hoyt (1942) 20 Ca1.2d 306 [125 P.2d 29]), suppression of
evidence (People v. Burton (1961) 55 Ca1.2d 328 [11 Cal.
Rptr. 65, 359 P.2d 433]), and failure to respond to accusatory
statements when not in police custody (see 19 Cal.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 401, p. 141 et seq.), its admission does not violate the
privilege. Moreover, as in the foregoing examples, the evidence
did not result from a situation contrived to produce conduct
indicative of guilt. Unlike the superstitious tests described by
Wigmore 8 and their modern successor, the lie detector,9 that
have as their sole purpose the establishment of an environment
in which the accused's consciousness of guilt can be detected,
the purpose of asking defendant to speak was to obtain probative physical evidence and the conduct was merely incident to
that effort. [10] [See fn. 10] A guilty party may prefer not
to find himself in a situation where consciousness of guilt may
be inferred from his conduct, but it can scarcely be contended
that the police, who seek evidence from the test itself, will
tend to coerce parties into refusing to take tests in order to
produce this evidence. 10
[11] Although conduct indicating consciousness of guilt is
often described as 'an "admission by conduct, "11 such
nomenclature should not obscure the fact that guilty conduct
is not a testimonial statement of guilt. It is therefore not
protected by the Fifth Amendment. By acting like a guilty
person, a man does not testify to his guilt but merely exposes

I. ..
I
!

8" 'In the olden time it was a popular superstition that the corpse
of the slain would bleed afresh if touched by the murderer; and it was
deemed almost conclusive of guilt that he who was charged with the
murder refused to lay his finger on the body or to take his hand; • • .' "
(2 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed. 1940) § 275.)
•
'The lie detector operates on a principle of observable physiological
deviations from the norm when an accused attempts to avoid verbal
responses which he thinks will indicate guilt. It is designed to probe the
conscious knowledge of the accused and in that respect sought-after reaponses may be viewed as essentially testimonial. (Bee Bchmerber v.
California, supra. 384 U.B. 757, 764.)
10Protection from possible police abuse in obtaining evidence is of
course one of the primary reasons for the existence of the Fifth Amendment privilege, but the protection is unnecessary when police efforts in
conducting voice tests will tend to prevent, not induce, the production of
evidence of a refusal to cooperate.
uSee, e.g., McCormick, Evidence, 11247-21)0.
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himself to the drawing of inferences from circumstantial evidence of his state of mind. 12
We are aware that the United States Supreme Court in
Schmcrbcr v. California (1966) 384 U.S. 757, 765, fn. 9 [16
L.Ed.2d 908, 86 S.Ct. 1826], has cautioned that in some cases
the administration of tests might result in "testimonial
products" proscribed by the privilege. 'Ve do not believe,
however, that the inferences flowing from guilty conduct are
such testimonial products. Rather, the court's concern seemed
directed to insuring full protection of the testimonial privilege
from even unintended coercive pressures. In the case of a
blood test, for example, the court considered the possibility
that fear induced by the prospect of having the test administered might itself provide a coercive device to elicit incriminating statements. 13 Such a compelled testimonial product
would of course be inadmissible.
Evidence' of the refusal is not only probative; its admission
operates to induce suspects to cooperate with law enforcement
officials. Only the overriding interest in protecting the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, itself the result of
a delicate balance, prohibits evidence or comment in the
refusal to testify cases. But the privilege itself is not at issue
here. ,\Vithout exception, none of the reasons that support the
privilege lends support to a rule that would exclude probative
evidence obtained from an accused's effort to conceal nonprivileged evidence.
[12] In the present case, however, the police officers
12Wigmore was careful to distinguish conduct as evidence of beliet
from admissions. He not only makes the general point that the term
, 'implied admissions" is somewhat misleading, even when applied to
witnesses in a civil case (2 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed. 1940) § 267,
p. 95), but he stresscs that in criminal cases guilty conduct on the part
of an accused is evidence in which the "circumstantial nature of the
inference strongly dominates the testimonial aspect. . . • " (2 Wigmore,
op. cit., supra, at p. 94.)
The inferential chain here is no different from that which makes any
event that docs not directly illuminate the circumstances of the crime
charged a relevant fnct. The trier of fact must reason from, for example,
an escape from jail, to a consciousness of guilt that would motivate the
escapee's conduct, and, from that premise, to the conclusion that such
conduct is relevant to the ultimate issue of guilt or innocence. The key
factor is that no testimony of an nccused, or other equivalent intended to
communicate knowledge, such as n writing, sign langunge, or a demonstration, forms the basis for the inferential chain.
13" Indeed, there may be circumstances in which the pnin, danger, or
severity of nn operation would almost inevitnbly cause a person to prefer
confession to undergoing the search, and nothing we say today should be
taken as estnblishing the permissibility of compulsion in that case."
(Schmerber v. California, 8upra, 384 U.S. 757, 765, fn. 9.)
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warned defendant that he llad the right to remain silent anu
that anything he said could be used against him. This warning
did not distinguish between speech in terms of communications and speech for voice identification, between a refusal to
speak free from sanctions and a refusal to speak productive of
detrimental inferences. That distinction would hardly occur to
a layman unless it was called to his attention. Thus, defenuant's refusal to speak might well have been the direct result of
the police warning and cannot be used against him. (Cf. Johnson v. United States (1943) 318 U.S. 189 [87 L.Ed. 704, 63
8.Ct. 549] ; People v. Gilbert (1944) 25 Ca1.2d 422, 443 [154
P.2d 657].)
[13] The usual Fifth Amendment warning that a suspect
has a right to remain silent creates this problem, for if taken
literally it includes the right not to speak at all.14 After
having given such a warning, if the police direct a defendant
to speak for voice identification and he refuses, they must, as a
prerequisite to the use of the defendant's refusal to speak as
evidence of consciousness of guilt, advise him that the right to
remain silent does not include the right to refuse to participate in such a test.
Defendant also assigns as error the prosecutor's repeated
references to him and his alibi witness as perjurers. [14] Interpretive, but fair, comment on evidence submitted to the
jury is proper. The prosecutor should point out the conflicts
and inconsistencies in the evidence and those evidentiary
matters that render the prosecution testimony more believable
than that submitted by the defense.
Prosecutors tread on dangerous ground, however, when they
resort to epithets to drive home the falsity of defense evidence.
(See People v. Love (1961) 56 Cal.2d 720,731 [16 Cal.Rptr.
777, 17 Cal.Rptr. 481, 366 P.2d 33, 809].) [15] The term
.liar,lli for instance, implies more than offering untrue testimony; it implies a wilful falsehood. (Webster's New Internat.
HEven if the warning is understood in this literal sense. however. it

is not misleading if the evidence sought is not speech for voice identifica·
tion but evidence of other physical characteristics such as photographs.
fingerprints, or blood samples.
uiThe appellate court has characterized use of the term liar as
"harsh." but "in the realm of fair comment." (People v. Mora (1956)
139 Cal.App.2d 266. 272-273 [293 P.2d 522].) In that case conflicting
stories of witnesses were before the jury and no objection to the use of
the term was made at the trial. (Cf. People v. Baker (1960) 183 Cal.
App.2d 615, 624-625 [7 Cal.Rptr. 22].)
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Dict. (2d ed. 1939).) 'rhe term perjurer has, as its only formal
semantic distinction vis-a.-vis liar, the additional element of
the oath. (Webster's New Internat. Dict. (2d ed. 1939); see
Pen. Code, § 118.) A charge of perjury, however, produces
more than moral opprobrium. Perjury is a felony, and the
connotation. conveyed to the jury is therefore apt to be far
more derogatory than that conveyed by the term liar. Particularly when applied to the defendant, it is apt adversely and
unnecessarily to affect the ability of the jury dispassionately
to weigh the credibility of the accused and the issue of guilt or
innocence. [16] Unless the prosecutor is careful to state ___ ""
that his conclusion that perjury was committed is predicated
solely on the evidence before the jury, the spectre of jury
reliance on prosecutorial access to information outside the
record is raised. (See People v. Perez (1962) 58 Ca1.2d 229,
246 [23 Cal.Rptr. 569, 373 P.2d 617].)
[17] . In attacking the credibility of defense witnesses, a
single reference to a witness as having perjured himself, based
on an analysis of the evidence before the jury, may be
unobjectionable. (Cf. People v. Muir (1966) 244 Cal.App.2d
598, 601-602 [53 Cal.Rptr. 398].) When, however, as in
this case, the prosecutor makes repeated references to defendant and his wife as perjurers,18 notwithstanding objection,
and further makes a suggestion that the issue of perjury bears
16Prosecutor: "I had to bring them all back, every single instance
where he was pinned down, it turned out he was talking a lie, I-i-e, lie,
and that went throughout this entire trial. This trial baa been loaded
with perjury and lies, not one single witness for the People was shaken on
cross-examination. ' ,
"
Defense Counsel: "Your Honor, I am going to object to that alleg~'
tion as to perjury. . . ."
Prosecutor: "I didn't say 'perjury.' I said lies-"
Defense Counsel: "He said perjury."
The Court: "Your' statement was that your case was loaded down with
perjury, counsel."
Prosecutor: "Oh, well, with lies. And it was, wasn't itt Did you ever
hear such a mob as testified in this case for the defense'" (Rep. Tr.•
vol. 3, pp. 27, 28.)
Prosecutor: "[B]eeause of her [defendant's wife] afrection for this
defendant, for the want of stronger terms, she got on the stand and she
actually perjured herself. She swore on an oath before God, so help me
God, I will tell the truth. . . . " (Rep. Tr., vol. 3, p. 31.)
Prosecutor: "He has the receipt from Sacramento dated September
5th, that was the very foundation of two crimes of perjury right here in
this courtroom. Him and his wife." (Rep. Tr., vol. 3, p. 32.)
Prosecutor: "[H]e [defendant] put his poor wife on the stand and
made a perjurer out of her• . . . " (Rep. Tr., vol. 3, p. 34:.)
Prosecutor: "[I]f you accept the word of an acknowledged perjurer
and the word of an acknowledged perjurer'8 wife. • • ." (Rep. Tr.,
vol. 3, p. 61.)
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directly on the issue of guilt,17 his argument constitutes
misconduct. (Cf. People v. Oonover (1966) 243 Cal.App.2d
38 [52 Cal.Rptr. 172]; People v. Reese (1963) 220 Cal.App.
2d 143 [33 Cal.Rptr. 561].)
[18] The question remains whether the errors were prejudicial. The evidence presents clearly conflicting stories regarding the crime charged. The victim's identification of defendant was supported by the newsboy, who was unable to identify
defendant, but who testified that defendant's car was" similar
to the one" he had seen the assailant drive. Defendant and
his wife testified that they remained at a bowling alley in
Richmond until 4 :30 on the morning of the assault, at which
time they drove back to Redwood City by way of San Jose.
Two independent witnesses, the bowling alley proprietor and
his wife, testified to the presence of defendant and his wife at
the bowling alley and to their departure at an hour that would
have precluded the possibility of defendant's presence at the
scene of the crime..
Defendant was identified by three women who testified to
five incidents ranging from indecent exposure to use of
obscene language in a solicitation to sexual intercourse. None
of these incidents involved violence. The first woman'sidentification was based on a single midnight encounter that had
occurred two years earlier. Defendant denied the incident. The
second woman testified to being followed in the early morning
hours by a man in a car who ran towards her when she parked
her car and began walking toward her house. Defendant testified that he was lost that night, was merely attempting to
orient himself, and had no evil intent.
The third woman identified defendant and testified to three
incidents that occurred after the crime charged and were
spaced about two weeks apart. Defendant denied two of the
incidents. As to the third incident, which occurred on September 6, 1964, defendant offered an alibi. He testified that both
he and his wife were in Sacramento at a bowling tournament
on that morning. Defendant's wife and his mother corroborated this alibi. Two disinterested rebuttal witnesses, however,
testified that they accompanied defendant to Sacramento and
participated in the bowling tournament, that defendant's wife
did not make the trip, and that defendant drove back from
Sacramento in time to leave the witnesses at a point near the
scene of the incident more than an hour before it occurred.
17" [YJou can do nothing else but find a perjurer guilty of the charge."
(Rep. Tr., vol. 3, p. 35.)
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The jury was presented with directly conflicting evidence
supported by independent witnesses on both sides. The evidence of consciousness of guilt improperly interjected a factor
particularly damaging in a case where the defense is an alibi.
The improper argument made the crucial task of objectively
weighing the conflicting evidence susceptible to a subjective
rejection of the defense evidence. \Ve find, therefore, that it is
reasonably probable that a result more favorable to defendant
would have been reached absent the errors. (People v. Watso'll
(1956) 46 Ca1.2d 818, 836 [299 P.2d 243].)
The judgment is reversed.
Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Burke, J., and Peek, J.,. concurred.
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MOSK, J.-I dissent.
The majority opinion easily persuades me that "voice identi.----fication is· not within the privilege against self-incrimina.
tion," and that the rule of Griffin v. Oalifornia (1965) 380
U.S. 609 [14 L.Ed.2d 106, 85 S.Ct. 1229], is inapplicable when
the defendant has no constitutional right to refuse to speak
solely for purposes of voice identification.
.
Our problem ends with the foregoing determination. The
adoption of yet another rule for police procedure adds a superfluous burden to what the majority has appropriately called
, 'a system dedicated to ascertainment of truth. ' ,
A defendant warned that he has a right to remain silent
understands he cannot be compelled to give a statement relating to the offense he is suspected of committing. But certainly
he cannot reasonably infer from the mandatory admonition
that he may remain mute thereafter for all purposes. He is
required to respond when asked his name, address, place of
employment, next of kin, name of his attorney, and other relevant biographical information. When he goes to court, he may
be asked similar questions, and generally he is expected to
personally announce his plea (Pen. Code, § 1018). Queries of
that type and the vocal response are designed not to effectuate
self-incrimination but to achieve an orderly administration of
justice.
Of a more substantive nature are other permissible efforts of
the state to obtain the facts necessary for ascertainment of the
truth, through fingerprinting, photographing, measuring the
suspect; imprinting a portion of the suspect's body; physical
*Retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court sitting under assignment by the Chairman of the Judicial Coullcil.
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examination of the body; removal of or placing articles of
clothing on the suspect; requiring the suspect to stand, assume
a stance, walk, make a particular gesture, to write for identification; requiring the suspect to appear in a lineup and ill
court; or listening to his 'Voice. (8 Wigmore, Evidence
(McNaughton rev. 1961) pp. 387-399.} Nothing in Griffin ~ug
gests the impropriety of commenting on defendant's refusal to
render at least passive cooperation with the foregoing procedures. Indeed, Griffin is limited to prohibiting "comment on
the refusal to testify . . . [because it] is a penalty imposed by
courts for exercising a constitutional privilege. " (P. 614.)
I harbor serious doubts as to the ability of peace officers to
devise a comprehensible warning, as required by the majority,
that will "distinguish between speecll in terms of communication and speech for voice identification, between a refusal to
speak free from sanctions and a refusal to speak productive of
detrimental inferences." If this is too subtle a distinction for
laymen, it is equally so for those in the field of law enforcement.
Since we found no self-incrimination problem involved here
and Griffin is inapplicable, I perceive no bar to affirming the
judgment and I would do so.
McComb, J., concurred.

